Date: Wed, 6 Jul 1994 22:33:58 -0400 (EDT) From: Competitive Enterprise Institute Subject: CEI LIST - TERM LIMITS AND THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS To: Recipients of the CEI List TERM LIMITS AND THE AMERICAN RULING CLASS by Marlo Lewis Jr., CEI executive director appeared in *The Washington Times*, 7/5/94 The Supreme Court has agreed to review an Arkansas case (U.S. Term Limits vs. Thornton) that struck down a voter-approved measure restricting the number of times the state's own members of Congress may appear on the ballot. At stake is the constitutionality of the congressional term limit initiatives that passed by large margins in 14 states on election day 1992. More people voted for term limits in each of those states than voted for Bill Clinton. In fact, more voted for term limits in the 14 states combined than voted for Ross Perot nationwide. If the 1992 elections were in any real sense a "mandate for change," the mandate was for abolishing the incumbency protection racket that has produced scandal-ridden, unaccountable, unaffordable government. It's obvious why the Tom Foleys and Dan Rostenkowskis strongly oppose term limits. Unfortunately, some free market enthusiasts are also opposed, or at least remain dubious about what they regard as a political gimmick or fad. Yet everyone who thinks government is too big and wasts too much money should embrace the term limitation movement at his very own. The principal cause of the unchecked growth of government in America is the closing of our political system -- the transformation of Congress and many state legislatures into exclusive clubs with lifetime memberships. Political establishments are the bane of limited government. A political establishment is a de facto ruling class, and every ruling class naturally seeks to expand the scale and scope of its power. The Washington establishment, with its corrupting subsidies, debilitating taxes, and invasive regulations, perfectly illustrates the point. But why do we need term limits? Can't we just vote the rascals out? Usually not. Politicians have a knack for figuring out how to use public resources for private gain. If allowed to remain in office for life, they will obsess on getting re-elected and contrive to stack the electoral decks in their favor. Consider the array of incumbent advantages that protects and sustains the Washington establishment: "free" staff specializing in constituent service, "free" postage for congressional junk mail, billions in pork handouts for special interest groups, bogus campaign finance reforms that handicap challengers, and cushy salaries that allow lawmakers to campaign full-time without quitting their regular jobs. Limiting members of Congress to six years in the House and twelve in the Senate would advance free market reform in several ways. First, Congress would become more genuinely representative. More members would be elected directly from the hardworking, overtaxed, overregulated private sector -- and fewer from the ranks of privileged incumbency. Also, the likely prospect of having to find a non-government job in a few short years would encourage all members to consider the economic consequences of federal programs. Second, term limits would clear away entrenched legislative roadblocks. Think of how many worthy proposals have been killed by committee chairmen whose tenured control over vast resources renders them virtually immune to electoral challenge. Term limits, as John Fund argues, would redistribute committee-based power before it could be held long enough to erect unaccountable legislative fiefdoms. Third, term limits would promote economic sanity simply by cutting short the typical lawmaker's exposure to incessant pro-government pleading and advocacy -- what political scientist James L. Payne calls the "culture of spending." Research by Tom Miller of the Competitive Enterprise Institute provides empirical support for this view. In a study of congressional voting from 1985 through 1991, Miller found that House members with fewer than three terms in office voted on average for 40.6 percent of all spending restraint measures, as against 26.9 percent for members with more than six terms. In other words, junior members were 48 percent more likely to vote for spending restraint than the senior members. Finally, term limits would make electoral contests more competitive and remove perverse incentives that fuel government's growth. Under term limits, special interests could not keep their congressional patrons in office, no matter how lavish their campaign support. Interest groups would thus have less incentive to "invest" in incumbents. By t he same token, lawmakers could not make a career of serving in Congress, no matter how many entitlements they created or how much pork they dispensed. Elected officials would thus have less incentive to tax and spend. Term limits are not a "magic bullet." But then what is? Term limits are a critical first step to dismantling the political establishments that profit from government expansion. If the Supreme Court upholds Arkansas' term limit initiative, free marketeers should cheer. _______ __________ ___________ / | / | | | |__________ | | | | \ | | \ _______ |__________ ___________ COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 1001 Connecticut Ave. NW #1250 Washington, DC 20036 202-331-1010, fax 202-331-0640 Permission to copy granted as long as these lines are left intact. To subscribe to the cei list, send a message to cei@digex.com. "The Virtual Hand: CEI's guide to the information superhighway" is available for $5. CEI's monthly newsletter, "CEI UpDate," is free to contributors of $25.