Date: Mon, 9 Jan 1995 18:43:55 -0500
From: Craig Peterson <craig>
To: best-rkba
Subject: Ruby Ridge (Randy Weaver) Incident: FBI disciplines some employees - talk.politics.guns

[Edited to fix wrap problems.  No action taken against the sniper.
Craig.]

In article <3eljd3$4lc@ionews.io.org>, ndallen@io.org (Nigel Allen) writes:
Here is a press release from the FBI.
I downloaded the press release from the PR On-Line BBS in Maryland
at 410-363-0834. I do not work for the FBI

 FBI Director Disciplines FBI Employees in Connection with Ruby Ridge Incident
 To: National Desk
 Contact: Federal Bureau of Investigation National Press Office,
          202-324-3691

   WASHINGTON, Jan. 6 -- The following was released by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation today :

   FBI Director Louis J. Freeh announced today that he has disciplined
12 FBI employees for their conduct related to the 1992 Ruby Ridge,
Idaho, incident and the subsequent prosecution of Randall Weaver and
Kevin Harris.
   This disciplinary action follows the completion of an FBI
administrative review of the conduct of its employees associated with
their activities at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, in response to the killing of
Deputy United States Marshal William Degan, the accidental death of
Vicki Weaver, and the subsequent prosecution of Randall Weaver and
Kevin Harris.
   "The crisis at Ruby Ridge resulted in the tragic deaths of Deputy
United States Marshal William Degan and Vicki and Sammy Weaver and the
FBI is saddened by the loss of life," Freeh said.  "Based on the
killing of Deputy Marshal Degan and the known willingness of the
Weavers to violently resist the lawful authority of the federal
government, the crisis was one of the most dangerous and potentially
violent situations to which FBI agents have ever been assigned," Freeh
also said.
   "A careful and thorough review of the facts here shows that the FBI
employees committed no crimes or intentional misconduct," Freeh said.
"Significantly, after a Department of Justice Task Force completed its
work, the department's Office of Professional Responsibility carefully
reviewed the facts and concluded that the FBI employees committed no
crimes.  Similarly, the department's Civil Rights Division
independently analyzed the facts and agreed that criminal prosecution
was not warranted," Freeh said.
   "Despite the fact that there is no evidence of intentional
misconduct by FBI employees, I have concluded, after a careful and
deliberate review of the facts, that the FBI employees disciplined
demonstrated inadequate performance, improper judgment, neglect of
duty and failure to exert proper managerial oversight," Freeh said.
   "Commensurate with their failures in conduct, I have imposed
discipline on 12 FBI employees ranging from an oral reprimand or
written censure to written censure with suspension from duty and other
action," Freeh said.
   "With regard to the accidental and tragic death of Vicki Weaver, I
have decided no administrative action is warranted.  The FBI's
sniper's shots were taken in defense of other law enforcement officers
on the scene and were consistent with the law and FBI policy," Freeh
said.
   "Importantly, policies and procedures have already been modified
and improved to help ensure future crises are handled appropriately,"
Freeh said.
   Freeh said that the following disciplinary action was being taken
against the below-listed employees:

   "I have recommended to the Deputy Attorney General, as I am
required to do by regulation, that a letter of censure be issued to
Acting Deputy Director Larry A. Potts, who was then the Assistant
Director of the Criminal Investigative Division, based on his failure
to provide proper oversight with regard to the rules of engagement.
As head of the FBI's Criminal Investigative Division, Potts had
overall responsibility for the crisis incident and FBI participation
in the subsequent prosecution.
   "Danny O. Coulson, now Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the Dallas
Field Office, and then-Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal
Investigative Division also received a letter of censure for his
failure to provide proper managerial oversight relating to the rules
of engagement.
   "Eugene F. Glenn, SAC of the FBI's Salt Lake Field Office and On-
Scene Commander at Ruby Ridge, Idaho, has been recommended, pursuant
to FBI Senior Executive Service policy, for censure and a 15-day
suspension from duty.  In addition, I have removed him from his field
command and reassigned him to FBI Headquarters.  This action is based
on SAC Glenn's inadequate performance as On-Scene Commander in
approving the rules of engagement and his failure adequately and
personally to address the poor working relationship with the United
States Attorney's Office.
   "The Commander of the Hostage Rescue Team at the time of the
incident, who has since voluntarily accepted a field investigative
reassignment, has been issued a letter of censure and suspended from
duty for 10 days.  His drafting and recommending of rules of
engagement that arguably directed agents to act contrary to FBI policy
and law, though not causally related to the shooting death of Vicki
Weaver, demonstrated performance below the level expected of a person
in his position of responsibility.
   "E. Michael Kahoe, who is now the SAC of the Jacksonville Field
Office and who was then a Section Chief in the Criminal Investigative
Division at FBI Headquarters, was responsible for the preparation of
the Shooting Incident Review Group Report that inaccurately and
incompletely analyzed the accidental shooting death of Vicki Weaver.
Based on his neglect of duty with regard to the rules of engagement,
the accidental shooting of Vicki Weaver, and incomplete documentation
of the shooting incident review process, SAC Kahoe has been proposed,
pursuant to FBI Senior Executive Service policy, for censure and
suspension from duty for a period of 15 days.
   "The agent in charge of the Shooting Incident Review Team that
conducted interviews and collected evidence related to the shots fired
by the FBI sniper was also disciplined.  His analysis of the propriety
of the shots was incomplete and his conclusion concerning the shot
that accidentally killed Vicki Weaver was inaccurate.  His performance
was below that expected of agents in his position and, accordingly, he
has been censured and suspended from duty for 5 days.
   "Three FBI agents have also been censured and two agents
reprimanded for failure to adequately preserve crime scenes, document
crime scene searches, collect and preserve evidence, and transmit
evidence to the FBI laboratory for examination.  One of these agents
will also be reassigned.  One FBI laboratory employee has been
reprimanded for failing to accurately prepare a crime scene depiction.
   "Two other former FBI employees were also found to have
demonstrated inadequate performance in the conduct of their official
duties, but because each has since retired from the FBI, disciplinary
action is unavailable.  The names of these ex-agents and the names of
other current agents not identified have been withheld pursuant to the
privacy act."

   Freeh further described the circumstances surrounding the FBI's
activities at Ruby Ridge.  He explained that the FBI agents deployed
to Idaho were asked to attempt the peaceful arrest of Randall Weaver
who was under indictment for federal weapons offenses and who was
believed to have been involved with the homicide of Deputy Marshal
Degan on Aug. 21, 1992.  The killing of Deputy Marshal Degan occurred
as he was withdrawing from the Weaver property where he and fellow
marshals had been engaged in official business preparing to execute
the outstanding arrest warrant for Weaver.
   In addition, based on information collected by the U.S. Marshal's
Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; the FBI; and
other law enforcement agencies, FBI agents knew or believed that (a)
at the time of Weaver's previous arrest, he tried to wrestle a weapon
away from the officer; (b) Weaver, and his family, were associated
with extremist groups and possessed a cache of weapons and a supply of
ammunition and were trained in the use of firearms; (c) Weaver claimed
to have received special military training as a Green Beret; (d) the
Weavers had written letters to the United States Attorney's office
denying, in threatening tones, the authority of the Federal
government; (e) it was reported that even the Weaver children were
armed; (f) Weaver told his neighbor that he would not submit to arrest
and that he and his family were prepared to die in resistance, if
necessary; and (g) Weaver was a survivalist who was prepared to
forcibly defend his home against law enforcement officers, including
the placement of explosive devices on the property.
   Upon arrival in Idaho, FBI snipers were assigned to establish
protective perimeter positions.  Once in place, an FBI sniper observed
an armed suspect brandish his shoulder weapon at a helicopter carrying
other FBI agents and fired one round to protect the lives of those
agents.  The shot struck, but did not disable, the suspect who then
ran back toward the Weavers' cabin still carrying his weapon, together
with two other armed individuals.  Just as the last armed male -- who
the sniper believed to be the man he had shot at before -- reached the
front door of the cabin, the sniper fired a second shot in an attempt
to prevent the armed suspect from gaining the tactical advantage of
the cover of the fortified cabin from which he could have fired upon
law enforcement officers.  That shot struck the suspect and also
accidentally struck and killed Vicki Weaver who, unknown to the
sniper, was standing on the porch immediately behind the open door of
the cabin.
   Based on the combination of the facts concerning the murder of
Deputy Marshal Degan, the Weavers' willingness to resort to violence,
and the threat posed by the suspects to the FBI employees on the scene
and in the helicopter, Freeh has determined that the FBI sniper's
actions were consistent with law and FBI policy which permit the use
of deadly force in self-defense or the defense of others and has found
no basis for administrative action.
   The suspects surrendered nine days later without further violence.
A prosecution of two suspects, Randall Weaver and Kevin Harris,
followed and resulted in Weaver's conviction on the original weapons
violations and Weaver's and Harris' acquittal on other changes.  The
FBI was criticized and alleged to have engaged in misconduct for its
handling of the crisis, the crime scene searches, evidence collection
and handling, and production of records pursuant to court-ordered
discovery.  Freeh ordered a complete review of all allegations of
misconduct and inadequate performance.
   The administrative review was conducted from Oct. 31 through Dec.
16, 1994, and focused upon, but was not limited to, issues identified
by the Department of Justice's Ruby Ridge Task Force Report, which was
made available to the FBI last fall.  Based on the Task Force's
Report, the Department of Justice concluded that no criminal charges
against any FBI employee were warranted.  Nonetheless, Director Freeh
ordered the administrative review team to conduct a complete analysis,
including an examination of original witness statements and other
evidence gathered during the earlier Department of Justice probe, and
necessary additional investigation.
   The administrative review found three major areas of inadequate
performance, neglect of duty, and failure of FBI executives to exert
proper managerial oversight.  First, the rules of engagement designed
to provide guidance to FBI personnel on the scene regarding the use of
deadly force were poorly drafted, confusing, and can be read to direct
agents to act contrary to law and FBI policy.  Though ultimately the
FBI sniper's decision to shoot was guided by the FBI's policy
permitting the use of deadly force in self-defense or the defense of
others and not the rules of engagement, the promulgation of the rules
of engagement was a failure of the On-Scene Commanders.  In addition,
supervisory personnel at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C., were
remiss in failing to determine the rules of engagement actually
implemented at Ruby Ridge.

   Second, as the FBI does in all cases in which FBI agents fire their
weapons in the line of duty, a Shooting Incident Review was conducted
and a report prepared to permit the FBI to assess the propriety of the
shooting and determine if policy changes governing the use of deadly
force are needed. Though the Shooting Incident Review Team
investigation was thorough and complete, the analysis of the shooting
and the conclusions reached were inaccurate and incomplete.  Moreover,
the report of the Shooting Incident Review Group was also seriously
flawed, containing inaccuracies and invalid conclusions and the
process employed to conduct the review was inadequately documented.
Overall, this internal review process revealed carelessness and
superficiality on the part of senior FBI officials.  Due in part to
this failed process, an accurate assessment of the propriety of the
shooting was impeded for over two years.
   Third, a strained relationship between the FBI and the local United
States Attorney's Office that predated the crisis incident at Ruby
Ridge was not adequately addressed.  In fact, the strained
relationship was exacerbated during the events following the shooting
and, as a consequence, interfered with the cooperative relationship
necessary for an effective prosecution of the suspects and contributed
to an appearance of governmental ineptitude.  The ineffective working
relationship was not promptly, aggressively and consistently addressed
and undermined the mission of the FBI and the U.S. Department of
Justice in the state of Idaho.
   In addition to these major failings which resulted in the
discipline of six FBI agents, the review found inadequate performance
by six other current employees and two former employees relating to
crime scene searches and documentation, evidence collection and
submission for laboratory analysis, and response to court-ordered
discovery during the prosecutive stage of the case.
   Freeh also announced that other policy and procedure modifications
have already been instituted to ensure the proper handling of crisis
incidents.  Freeh has already reorganized the crisis response
capabilities of the FBI into a single crisis incident response group
under the leadership of an FBI executive experienced in crisis
response, increased the resources dedicated to the FBI's ability to
respond successfully to future crisis situations, and ordered
additional training in the area of crisis management.
   In addition, where rules of engagement are warranted, they must now
be approved at FBI Headquarters and subjected to legal review by the
executive management of the Office of the General Counsel.  Where the
On-Scene Commanders believe it necessary to communicate to their
agents an especially heightened risk, that will be done through the
use of separate threat advisories, rather than through modified rules
of engagement.  Further, the shooting incident review process will be
revamped to provide more specific guidance as to its mission and
procedures, and additional training and written protocols will be
provided to enable a more systematic investigation of shooting
incidents.

 -30-

-- 
Nigel Allen          ndallen@io.org